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A Nonfeminist’s Perspectives of Mothers and 
Homemakers Under Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles 
of the Law of Family Dissolution∗ 
F. Carolyn Graglia∗∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the vantage point of a nonfeminist mother and home-
maker, chapter 2, as well as chapter 6, of the ALI Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissolution contributes to the deconstruction of tradi-
tional nuclear families. This deconstruction will promote the feminist 
goal to deny sexual differences in order to create an androgynous so-
ciety in which men and women are as identical as possible. Such a 
society is antithetical to the maintenance of traditional families in 
which husband and wife perform complementary, not androgynous, 
roles: the wife as primarily a homemaker and child-rearer and the 
husband as primarily the financial provider for the family. The three-
decade decline in the number of these traditional families in our so-
ciety has been accompanied by an increasing tangle of pathologies 
that now characterize so many American families. 
In examining the legal profession’s attitudes toward traditional 
marriage, William C. Duncan points out that the Fall 1999 ALI Re-
porter had noted, “presumably with some pride,” that Playboy maga-
zine ranked the ALI 34th in its list of “men and women who 
changed the face of sex, for good or bad, during the past hundred 
years.” Tribute was due the ALI, said Playboy, as “the unsung heroes 
of the sexual revolution.”1 That the ALI surely is and, with these 
family dissolution principles, will continue to be. 
Those who think the sexual revolution was good for our society, 
 
∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on Feb-
ruary 1, 2001. 
 ∗∗ Attorney; B.A., Cornell University, 1951; LL.B., Columbia University Law School, 
1954. Author of DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY: A BRIEF AGAINST FEMINISM (1998). 
 1. William C. Duncan, State of the Bar: Marriage, “Sexual Orientation” and the Legal 
Profession 60 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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who think that there are no important biological differences between 
the sexes so that men and women should be considered fungible, 
who think that the traditional family plays no valuable role in creat-
ing a civil society, and who think that androgyny is a proper goal for 
a society would probably support all of the ALI Principles of the Law 
of Family Dissolution. Anyone who rejects these attitudes, however, 
should recognize that some of the Principles subvert the traditional 
family. 
The relevant provisions of the ALI Principles, discussed in Part 
II, recognize the functional equivalence of a variety of family struc-
tures, without regard to whether the cohabitants are married or un-
married or of the same or opposite sex. Through this recognition, 
the ALI accepts and validates the demise of traditional sex roles 
within our culture and the resulting creation of an androgynized so-
ciety. Part III discusses how these ALI Principles can be seen as the 
culmination of a nearly four-decade war that our society has waged 
against the traditional family and traditional sexual morality. The 
most powerful weapons in this war were the status degradation of 
the housewife’s role and the passage of no-fault divorce laws, which 
undermined her social and economic security. With these principles, 
the ALI accepts the fruits of the sexual revolution and the break-
down of the traditional family, abandoning that family as being no 
longer normative in our society but only one of several equivalent 
family structures. 
Part IV defends a family structure in which husband and wife 
perform traditional sex roles. Despite feminist claims that women 
who profess happiness in such roles are suffering from “false con-
sciousness” and “may not be the best judges of their own interests,” 
I contend that these roles are fulfilling for some women and that this 
family structure contributes to societal health and well-being. The 
great harm that divorce does to children is discussed in Parts V and 
VI, where I argue that the rearing of children by both natural par-
ents is generally far preferable to rearing by a single parent or by 
same-sex partners. In conclusion, Part VII questions the wisdom of 
continuing further on the path towards androgyny that has already 
taken us far towards sexual depolarization of our society. 
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II. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION 
Chapter 6 of the Principles undermines the traditional family by 
giving certain rights to unmarried couples upon the dissolution of 
their relationship. The “domestic partners” created by this chapter 
are defined as “two persons of the same or opposite sex, not married 
to one another.”2 Chapter 2 similarly protects the interests of cohab-
iting adults in an unmarried relationship. By creating the statuses of 
“parents by estoppel” and “de facto” parents, chapter 2 enables a 
cohabiting partner of the legal parent to share in custodial and deci-
sionmaking responsibility for children of the legal parent after the 
cohabiting relationship ends.3 
The comment to section 2.03 explicitly recognizes that 
“[a]lthough adoption is the clearer and thus preferred legal avenue 
for recognition of such parent-child relationships, adoption is some-
times not possible, especially if the adults are both women, or both 
men.”4 Furthermore, the comment notes that the “factfinder’s de-
termination should not turn upon whether the parties are a same-sex 
couple or a different-sex couple, or even whether the parties are mar-
ried, since these factors do not bear on whether a family relationship 
is planned.”5 
In allocating responsibility for children to individuals other than 
legal parents, section 2.21(2) provides for allocation to a grandpar-
ent or other relative who has “developed a significant relationship 
with the child” if the legal parent or parent by estoppel consents to 
the allocation and if the objecting parent “has not been performing a 
reasonable share of parenting functions.”6 This provision would seem 
to represent a small interference with the rights of legal parents and 
thus be little threat to the nuclear family. The Reporter’s Notes, 
however, recognize that states may apply a more liberal standard in 
visitation than in custody matters, noting that all states allow grand-
parent visitation in some circumstances.7 As in the case of the very 
 
 2. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS & 
RECOMMENDATIONS (Tentative Draft No. 4, Apr. 10, 2000) § 6.01(1). 
 3. Id. § 2.03.  
 4. Id. § 2.03 cmt. b at 211. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. § 2.21(2). 
 7. See id. § 2.21 cmt. b at 266. 
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broad Washington visitation statute, which was recently invalidated 
by the United States Supreme Court, some of these statutes do in-
deed permit what some supporters of the traditional family consider 
an unwarranted interference with parental rights.8 
The ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution would assur-
edly solidify changes wrought by the sexual revolution. Chapter 6 
substantially validates homosexual partnerships by elevating them to 
a status comparable to that of married couples, thus paving the way 
for legalization of same-sex marriages. At the same time, chapter 6 
protects many interests of cohabiting but unmarried heterosexual 
couples, thereby also validating these relationships and diluting in-
centives to marry. Similarly, chapter 2 validates the rearing of chil-
dren by same-sex couples through its recognition of their co-
parenting agreements and its creation of custodial rights in a partner 
of the legal parent upon termination of their relationship, despite the 
objection of that legal parent. By creating custodial rights in the op-
posite-sex cohabiting partner of a legal parent, chapter 2 also dilutes 
incentives to marry and legally adopt the child of a partner. 
How, one might ask, did such radical provisions find their way 
into recommendations of the American Law Institute, an organiza-
tion that, at one time, at least, was not perceived as a proselytizer for 
radical change in the law, but rather as a body of centrists who seek a 
moderate consensus on legal issues? Understanding this evolution 
requires a recognition of how far our society has traveled towards a 
rejection of traditionalism in matters pertaining to the family. 
III. SUBVERSION OF THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY 
Reflecting the tenuous state of marriage in our society, the pres-
ence or absence of a marital relationship is a largely irrelevant factor 
in decisions under either chapter 2 or 6 of the ALI Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissolution. This cavalier treatment of the marriage in-
stitution by the ALI continues the war on the traditional family and 
traditional sexual morality that has been waged for over three dec-
ades—in particular, by the feminist movement—to drive the home-
makers out of the home and into the workplace. This war began in 
1949 when Simone de Beauvoir, followed by Betty Friedan fourteen 
 
 8. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (holding that the visitation ordered in 
this case violated the parent’s fundamental due process right “to make decisions concerning 
the care, custody, and control of her two daughters”). 
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years later, undertook to degrade the status of the homemaker to the 
lowest position it has ever had in modern society.9 The women who 
spearheaded the feminist revolution became the darlings of the me-
dia, which quickly embraced the feminist cause and disseminated the 
movement’s castigations of homemakers as “parasites” who, accord-
ing to Betty Friedan, live without using adult capabilities or intelli-
gence. Homemakers’ lives, said Friedan, lack “a real function” and 
are a “waste of a human self.”10 
This feminist effort to convince society that a woman’s role as 
homemaker and child-rearer is vastly inferior to the role of market 
producer was hugely successful. Proof of its overwhelming success is 
all around us. On December 30, 1999, the front page of The New 
York Times, for example, quoted President Clinton’s statement prais-
ing the great success in putting mothers, who had been on welfare, 
into the work force and their children into day care. He said: “Work 
is more than just a weekly paycheck”; “[i]t is, at heart, our way of 
life. Work lends purpose and dignity to our lives.”11 This is the es-
sence of feminism. 
In the 1950s, a president would have been far more likely to say 
that the home and the family and the rearing of children—not mar-
ket work12—was, “at heart, our way of life” and that no other way of 
life could have a higher purpose and a greater dignity than rearing 
one’s own children at home. Who dares to make such a statement 
today? The latest New York Times Style Manual, on the contrary, ex-
plicitly tells writers to avoid using the term “housewife” and to resist 
using the term “homemaker” since the word is “belittling.”13 As one 
psychotherapist has noted, although “1950s’ culture accorded its 
full-time mothers unconditional positive regard,” today’s “stay-at-
home mothers I know dread the question ‘And what do you do?’”14 
 
 9. F. CAROLYN GRAGLIA, DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY: A BRIEF AGAINST FEMINISM 2, 
106–20 (1998). 
 10. Id. at 115–16. 
 11. Jason DeParle, Bold Effort Leaves Much Unchanged for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
30, 1999, at A1. 
 12. The terms “market work” and “market production” refer to work for wages, usually, 
but not always, performed outside the home, as distinguished from domestic activities, includ-
ing child-rearing, performed by the homemaker within her own home. 
 13. TIMES BOOKS, THE NEW YORK TIMES MANUAL OF STYLE AND USAGE 160, 162 
(Allan M. Siegal & William G. Connolly eds., 1999). 
 14. SHARI L. THURER, THE MYTHS OF MOTHERHOOD: HOW CULTURE REINVENTS 
THE GOOD MOTHER xix (1994). 
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The most powerful weapon used against this “belittled” home-
maker was probably the passage of no-fault divorce laws by all of our 
states between 1969 and 1985. The traditional fault-based divorce 
law had been the single most important structure at the foundation 
of traditional marriage. This law was designed to ensure the viability 
of marriages that were based on a sexual division of labor in which 
the wife assumed the domestic responsibilities of homemaking and 
child-rearing and the husband provided the economic support of the 
family.15 It is that traditional family which fault-based divorce laws 
were designed to protect. And it is that family which no-fault divorce 
laws are designed to destroy.16 
Through the enactment of no-fault divorce, society warned 
women that they were expected to abandon their child-rearing role, 
cease being financially dependent on their husbands, and become 
self-supporting. Because they viewed the traditional family as 
women’s oppressor, the feminist champions of no-fault divorce ar-
gued that women must pursue the careers which, feminists are con-
vinced, can be the only source of identity and self-fulfillment. With 
this ideology, feminists rejected the value of the female role, the re-
wards and importance of motherhood, and the worth of children to 
a degree never before witnessed in our society.17 
Thus, the function of no-fault divorce laws was to convince 
women that the entire society had also adopted this feminist ideol-
ogy, which devalued homemaking and child-rearing and respected 
only those who engaged in market production. The “present legal 
system,” concluded Lenore Weitzman, “makes it clear that instead of 
expecting to be supported, a woman is now expected to become self-
 
 15. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 15–20 (1985); 
Martha Heller, Note, Should Breaking-Up Be Harder to Do?: The Ramifications a Return to 
Fault-Based Divorce Would Have upon Domestic Violence, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 263 
(1996); Nicole D. Lindsey, Note, Marriage and Divorce: Degrees of “I Do,” an Analysis of the 
Ever-Changing Paradigm of Divorce, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 265, 268 (1998). 
 16. Under fault-based divorce law, a woman could make her marriage her career be-
cause “if the marriage did not endure and if the wife was virtuous, she was nevertheless prom-
ised alimony—a means of continued support.” WEITZMAN, supra note 15, at 11. No-fault di-
vorce changed marriage from an institution in which one had a right to remain married, if one 
adhered to the marriage contract, to an institution in which the protected right became the 
right to divorce. By taking all bargaining power away from the spouse who does not want the 
divorce, no-fault has greatly increased “the likelihood that divorce will in fact occur” and that 
it will be both “less difficult” and “less costly.” Id. at 27. 
 17. GRAGLIA, supra note 9, at 1–5, 33–35, 87–90. 
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sufficient.”18 Through our divorce laws, Mary Ann Glendon acutely 
observed, society tells mothers it is unsafe to devote themselves to 
raising children.19 
But has the evidence of family breakdown and of the resulting 
economic privation suffered by so many women and children under 
our current divorce regime caused feminists to change their minds?20 
On the contrary, the feminist remolders of society21 refuse to relin-
quish their strongest weapon in the battle to force all women to live 
by the feminist script. No-fault divorce laws must be retained, they 
argue, as the surest incentive to keep in the workplace the woman 
who would otherwise choose a traditional role in order to concen-
trate on what she values most highly: her marriage, her husband, and 
her children. 
To feminists, evidence of the economic hardship that divorce has 
inflicted on women and children simply reinforces their argument 
that women should never choose to be homemakers. The current di-
vorce regime must be retained, claims Herma Hill Kay, who was one 
of its architects. She concedes that “many couples still choose to fol-
low the traditional allocation of family functions by sex” and this 
“choice typically produces a family in which the wife and children are 
dependent upon the husband and father for support.”22 It is 
women’s “willingness to assume their traditional role as caretakers of 
children” which causes “their vulnerability at divorce.”23 Although 
“in the short run” some steps should be taken to alleviate the situa-
tion of current older housewives, Kay argues, “[i]n the long run” we 
should not “encourage future couples entering marriage to make 
choices that will be economically disabling for women, thereby per-
petuating their traditional financial dependence upon men and con-
tributing to their inequality with men at divorce.”24 
Kay warns that the danger in changing no-fault divorce laws to 
“prevent present disadvantage to women who have chosen tradi-
 
 18. WEITZMAN, supra note 15, at 143. 
 19. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 111 (1987). 
 20. Even Betty Friedan acknowledged that “housewives who divorced were in terrible 
straits.” WEITZMAN, supra note 15, at 360. 
 21. GRAGLIA, supra note 9, at 262–89. 
 22. Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its 
Aftermath, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 78 (1987). 
 23. Id. at 78–79. 
 24. Id. at 79–80. 
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tional roles in the past” is that this change will “encourage future 
women to continue to select traditional roles.”25 Her willingness to 
use divorce law to discourage marriages based on a traditional sexual 
division of labor is grounded in the belief, which is intrinsic to fem-
inist ideology, that “when both parents are available, neither should 
become the primary nurturing parent.”26 This is the goal that Kay 
would have divorce law serve, despite her recognition that many 
women want to assume a traditional role, despite her acknowledg-
ment of “the uniform historical practice in most primate and all 
known human societies of assigning the task of child care to the fe-
male,” and despite her awareness of significant scientific support for 
“the assertion that this particular division of function is based firmly 
on biological sex differences.”27 
For those mothers who yearn to be full-time child-rearers, it will 
be very difficult to comply with Kay’s admonitions to “recognize 
that their unique role in reproduction ends with childbirth” and to 
realize that if they would only accept this feminist insight, then they, 
“like men, should be able to lead productive, independent lives out-
side the family.”28 Kay does reassure these mothers that she does 
“not propose that the state attempt to implement this view of family 
life by enacting laws requiring mothers to work or mandating that 
fathers spend time at home with their children.”29 In order to ac-
complish her goal, Kay says, it is only necessary for society “to with-
draw existing legal supports” for traditional marriage “as a cultural 
norm,” a goal that she believes—quite accurately—no-fault divorce 
laws are already accomplishing.30 
It is beyond Kay’s ken, as well as that of most feminists, to rec-
ognize that some women consider the rewards of what Kay describes 
as “productive, independent lives outside the family” to be vastly in-
ferior to the relatively unlimited freedom of a domestic life rearing 
children at home. To understand why our society so readily chose to 
enact divorce laws designed to destroy the traditional family, one 
must realize that feminists with Kay’s views play an important, re-
spected role in the legal profession. Herma Hill Kay, for example, is 
 
 25. Id. at 90. 
 26. Id. at 81. 
 27. Id. at 82. 
 28. Id. at 84–85. 
 29. Id. at 85. 
 30. Id. 
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a law professor and was dean of the University of California Law 
School at Berkeley and president of the Association of American Law 
Schools.31 She was a member of the California Governer’s Commis-
sion on the Family, she was the co-reporter of the Uniform Marriage 
and Divorce Act, and she was a co-investigator on the California Di-
vorce Law Research Project.32 This woman, who admonishes other 
women “to recognize that their unique role in reproduction ends 
with childbirth,” is not considered a radical feminist on the fringe of 
society; rather, she is a dominant policymaker within society. It is the 
input of those with views like hers that has created and still maintains 
our current divorce regime that institutionalizes those views. 
Herma Hill Kay represents the overwhelmingly dominant view in 
legal academia. Few voices would be raised against her views, and 
many are raised to echo them, such as the call of a recent commenta-
tor for “measures that envisioned wage work as an important com-
ponent of women’s lives and identities, and, more radical still, of 
their independence from men.”33 The measures she advocates would 
include “better jobs and job training, wage subsidies, and collectiv-
ized child care.”34 
The feminist credo to which legal academia largely subscribes is 
that in a properly organized society all women would assume work-
place roles and share child-rearing and domestic tasks equally with 
their husbands. This belief requires rejection of divorce reforms that 
“would undermine any such strategy of equalizing parenting roles 
within the family. If once again given the option of relying on mar-
riage for lifelong support in order to allow the assumption of tradi-
tional gender roles, many women undoubtedly will be more likely to 
choose this option.”35 Even when the proposed divorce reform sim-
ply offers a covenant marriage option36 while leaving the no-fault sys-
 
 31. ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 654 (2000–2001). 
 32. Kay, supra note 22, at 1. 
 33. Vicki Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1918 (2000). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Heller, supra note 15, at 281. 
 36. Louisiana and Arizona have enacted such covenant marriage laws. LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:272 (West Supp. 1998) amended by 1997 La. Acts 1380, § 3; ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 
25-901 to 25-906 (1998). Covenant marriage laws have been proposed, but not enacted, in a 
number of states. The covenant marriage requirements would apply only to those who choose 
them. Generally, couples choosing a covenant marriage must participate in premarital counsel-
ing; they must also agree to attend counseling in the event of marital difficulties and to make 
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tem intact, the same arguments are used to defeat merely the possi-
bility of allowing some couples to choose a more binding marital 
commitment. Thus, Louisiana’s covenant marriage option is criti-
cized because it “would encourage women to resume traditional 
gender roles” and thereby “would cause a loss of ground in the area 
of financial independence for women.”37 
IV. A DEFENSE OF THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY 
Compared to the impact of no-fault divorce on the traditional 
family, the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution are insig-
nificant. To object to them, while accepting no-fault divorce, is in-
deed to strain at a gnat while swallowing a camel. The ALI Principles 
are designed to recognize and make accommodations to the wreck-
age left in the wake of the sexual revolution and the breakdown of 
the traditional family. And by traditional family, I do not mean sim-
ply a male-and-female-headed family as opposed to a single-sex-
headed family, but a family in which the male is the primary bread-
winner and the female is the primary child-rearer. 
The ideological underpinning of the two-career family, which is 
touted by our cultural elite as normative and encouraged by all femi-
nist initiatives, is feminist Karen DeCrow’s dictate: “[N]o man 
should allow himself to support his wife—no matter how much she 
favors the idea, no matter how many centuries this domestic pattern 
has existed, no matter how logical the economics of the arrangement 
may appear, no matter how good it makes him feel. . . . [L]ove can 
flourish between adults only when everyone pays his or her own 
way.”38 This feminist dogma demands that husband and wife discard 
the different, complementary roles that the experiences of the past 
 
reasonable efforts to preserve their marriage. A divorce can be obtained if these efforts fail. The 
grounds for divorce usually include adultery, conviction of a felony, abandonment, commission 
of family violence, a legal separation, or living without cohabitation for a stated number of 
years (often two). 
 37. Lindsey, supra note 15, at 280. One shining exception to the monolithic support of 
no-fault divorce in academia is the work of Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht, who drafted the 
Louisiana Covenant Marriage Law, enacted in 1997. See generally Katherine Shaw Spaht, Be-
yond Baehr: Strengthening the Definition of Marriage, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 277 (1998); Kathe-
rine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage, 73 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547 (1998); Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: 
Social Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63 (1998). Professor Mary Ann 
Glendon has also criticized the current divorce regime. See generally GLENDON, supra note 19. 
 38. Letters to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, May 31, 1992, at 12. 
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sixty years indicate are the most likely to produce stable marriages, 
enlivened by satisfying sexuality.39 
According to feminists, the ideal heterosexual marriage should be 
like a same-sex marriage, an institution now being fought for that 
would be the fitting capstone of a feminist society. The husband and 
wife that De Crow describes are simply roommates, each paying his 
own way and replicating each other. It would seem difficult for such 
a marriage to satisfy what Roger Scruton identified in his book Sex-
ual Desire as the foundation of heterosexual sexual excitement: “the 
energy released when man and woman come together is proportional 
to the distance which divides them when they are apart.”40 In their 
shared dedication to market work outside the home, their role-
sharing within the home, and their delegation of the bulk of child-
rearing activities to paid employees, these two-career heterosexual 
couples seem little different from same-sex couples. 
When the adults in both same-sex- and opposite-sex-headed 
families spend most of their waking hours doing market work, and 
when the children in both kinds of families are cared for during most 
of their waking hours by paid employees, on what basis can we dis-
tinguish between the two kinds of families? Is the fact of physical 
sexual difference enough on which to ground distinctions when that 
difference no longer manifests itself through the assumption of tradi-
tional sex roles? To the degree that heterosexual two-career families 
assume a respected and dominant position within our culture, it be-
comes increasingly difficult to resist the demands of same-sex couples 
to be treated in exactly the same way heterosexual couples are 
treated. Unless our society can sustain at least a noticeable propor-
tion, if not a critical mass, of traditional families—which are re-
spected and supported by the culture—then there is very little left to 
juxtapose against the androgynous society that the ALI now accepts 
as normative and seeks to accommodate with the Principles of the 
Law of Family Dissolution. 
But what societal needs will be served by restoring respect and 
support to the traditional family? Women like myself—and I am not 
alone in my feelings—can only be completely happy and fulfilled 
 
 39. GRAGLIA, supra note 9, at 24–26, 348–52. 
 40. ROGER SCRUTON, SEXUAL DESIRE: A MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE EROTIC 273 
(1986). 
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within the traditional family. We make our marriage our career.41 
When feminists tell us that our role is subservient—that we are op-
pressed by men and worthless to society in this role—we reply that, 
for us, entering the marketplace would be oppressive. For us, to 
leave our children with another woman in order to go do market 
work is not liberation but perdition. 
In reply, feminists tell us that we simply are suffering from “false 
consciousness.” We have, they say, been socialized by our culture to 
feel this way—our “preferences are socially constructed.”42 We have, 
in fact, internalized our own oppression, and because of our “in-
complete agency,” we “may not be the best judges of [our] own in-
terests or those of the community.”43 It is such cavalier dismissal of 
other women’s felt needs that justifies Herma Hill Kay’s use of no-
fault divorce laws to force these other women to adopt what Kay 
considers her more enlightened feminist belief that the unique fe-
male role in reproduction should end with childbirth—except, of 
course, in the case of those women who are paid child-care workers. 
V. ENCOURAGING AND PRESERVING MARRIAGE FOR THE 
CHILDREN’S SAKE 
I do not believe there is much room for accommodation bet-
ween these opposing views. Through their position in government 
bureaucracies, academia, and the media, moreover, feminists have 
largely put in place the current family policies of our society. They 
have been controlling the debate. But for the sake of our children, 
the traditional family deserves a defense; it has served our society well 
and should be enabled to continue in that service. In opposing legis-
lation that would validate domestic partnerships, John Cardinal 
O’Connor observed that equating the non-married state with the 
married state will influence the young by discouraging marriage. 
Certainly, our no-fault divorce laws already deliver the message that 
marriage does not matter in our society, and the recognition of legal 
rights in cohabiting partners will simply reinforce that message. The 
traditional family serves society’s needs, said Cardinal O’Connor, be-
cause “the lifelong commitment of one man to one woman in mar-
 
 41. GRAGLIA, supra note 9, at 106–08. 
 42. Tracy E. Higgins, Democracy and Feminism, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1657, 1690 
(1997). 
 43. Id. at 1696. 
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riage gives full expression to the kind of relationship that is best 
suited to the procreation, rearing and education of children.”44 
There can be no doubt that the period following World War II, 
when respect for the traditional family was at its height, was the 
golden age of the American family, with high marriage and birth 
rates, low illegitimacy, divorce, and crime rates, and the growth of a 
broad and stable middle class. But then our marriage and birth rates 
plummeted, while the rates of crime, unmarried cohabitation, di-
vorce, illegitimacy, and abortion skyrocketed. We now have the 
highest divorce and abortion rates in the western world, and one out 
of three children born today in this country is illegitimate.45 As a re-
sult of this startling increase in the number of divorces, as well as in 
the number of children born out of wedlock, a child today has only a 
fifty percent chance of reaching adulthood with a biological father in 
the home.46 
The benefits to children of living in an intact home with their 
natural parents are amply documented. Children living with fathers 
in the home have significantly higher intelligence scores than chil-
dren in homes without fathers.47 Children of divorced parents often 
experience poor school performance, poor self-control, drug abuse, 
and incapacity to provide for themselves or to form stable marriages 
when adults.48 To be raised in a single-parent home greatly increases 
the risk that children will live in poverty, that they will drop out of 
high school, and, for girls, that they will bear a child out of wed-
lock.49 The risk of physical abuse and of all types of neglect is higher 
among children of single parents, and one study has shown that pre-
schoolers living with a stepparent and a natural parent are forty times 
as likely to be abused as those living with both natural parents.50 
Boys raised without a father are statistically far more likely to become 
 
 44. John Cardinal O’Connor, Minimizing Marriage, WALL ST. J., May 29, 1998, at 
W9. 
 45. GRAGLIA, supra note 9, at 290–307. 
 46. David Popenoe, Parental Androgyny, SOC’Y, Sept.–Oct. 1993, at 5. 
 47. DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 
36 (photo. reprint 1981) (1965). 
 48. THOMAS G. WEST, VINDICATING THE FOUNDERS: RACE, SEX, CLASS, AND 
JUSTICE IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 95 (1997). 
 49. GLENN T. STANTON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: REASONS TO BELIEVE IN 
MARRIAGE IN POSTMODERN SOCIETY 108–19 (1997). 
 50. WEST, supra note 48, at 95–96. 
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violent criminals.51 
Analyzing the ways in which divorce harms both children and 
parents, Paul R. Amato and Alan Booth found that “parental divorce 
is associated with lower affection between children and parents,” 
“less coresidence with parents,” and “less frequent contact with par-
ents.”52 These “consequences of marital dissolution tend to be 
stronger for fathers than mothers.”53 “[A]dolescents from divorced 
families (both sons and daughters) become sexually active at younger 
ages and have a greater number of partners than do other ado-
lescents.”54 Parental divorce increases the risk that offspring will also 
divorce and that they will themselves experience lower marital qual-
ity. Thus, offspring of divorced parents are justifiably fearful about 
their own prospects for marrying and maintaining long-term inti-
mate relationships, and many of them fear betrayal from their com-
mitments.55 
Children of divorce suffer lower educational and occupational at-
tainment. They complete fewer years of education than children 
from intact families and these consequences are stronger for daugh-
ters than for sons.56 It is well established that “the socioeconomic re-
sources of stepfathers . . . have few consequences for stepdaughters. 
This finding is consistent with research suggesting that young adult 
offspring receive less assistance from stepfamilies than from continu-
ously intact families”: “some stepfathers may be unwilling to invest 
economic or interpersonal resources in their stepdaughters because 
of the tension that frequently characterizes these relationships.”57 
“Divorce appears to suppress most dimensions of socioeconomic at-
tainment . . . by lowering parental support of children (helping chil-
 
 51. Id. at 97; Maggie Gallagher, Fatherless Boys Grow Up into Dangerous Men, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 1, 1998, at A22 (noting that boys raised outside of intact marriages are more than 
twice as likely as other boys to end up jailed: each year spent without a father in the home in-
creases the odds of future incarceration by about five percent). 
 52. PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN 
ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 81 (1997). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 107. 
 55. Id. at 108–09. 
 56. Id. at 173. The children of divorce have an education deficit of about one-half year. 
Although this “may not sound like much,” since “each year of education raises annual income 
by nearly $4,000,” this annual gap in income “multiplied by the number of years that a person 
is in the workforce, amounts to a substantial lifetime difference in earnings.” Id. at 222. 
 57. Id. at 162–63. 
5GRAC.DOC 12/5/01  1:30 AM 
993] A Nonfeminist’s Perspectives 
 1007 
dren with homework, discussing children’s personal problems, and 
so on) and parents’ expectations for children’s education.” More-
over, since “divorce proneness” in continuously married families also 
predicts offspring’s outcomes, it appears that “both the increasing 
divorce rate and the increasing instability of intact marriages are low-
ering the potential of future generations to succeed economically.”58 
Against this well-documented background of children’s suffer-
ing, the American Law Institute does not suggest reform of our di-
vorce laws so as to teach our citizens that marriage matters and, in 
particular, that great efforts should be expended to preserve mar-
riages that have produced children. Rather the ALI, apparently in 
devotion to the right of adults to pursue individual autonomy with-
out regard to any other obligations, further trivializes marriage by 
giving status to and protecting the interests of adults in cohabiting 
relationships. Thus, it encourages relationships that are much less 
stable than marital ones and that are producing increasing numbers 
of children, who will often have all the problems of children of di-
vorce compounded by the fact that they are born out of wedlock. 
VI. PARENTAL ANDROGYNY 
But cannot the ills of single parenthood be ameliorated by offer-
ing the child two mommies or two daddies, a lifestyle that the ALI 
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution would validate? However 
good the outcomes may appear to be in any particular case, society 
should encourage and validate the family in which Heather has a 
mommy and a daddy, not two mommies.59 Without doubt, our cul-
ture’s encouragement of “parental androgyny,” in which fathers and 
mothers play essentially the same social roles in the family, has cre-
ated fertile ground for social acceptance of Heather’s two mommies. 
But as David Popenoe, a sociologist of the family, states, “family or-
ganization is based on very real, biological differences between men 
and women. Parental androgyny is not what children need. Neither 
is it a good basis for a stable, lasting marriage.”60 
We can expect optimal child development to occur when both a 
father and a mother are in the home, each acting in different ways, 
 
 58. Id. at 181. 
 59. See LESLEA NEWMAN, HEATHER HAS TWO MOMMIES (1989) (validating homosex-
ual parenting). 
 60. Popenoe, supra note 46, at 6. 
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distinctively masculine or feminine, towards the child. It is socially 
destructive when society refuses to acknowledge the very real differ-
ences between men and women and the myriad ways in which these 
differences mold the parents’ relations with their children. Because of 
their biological differences, says Popenoe, “the sexes are not inter-
changeable in child care.”61 “Most dads,” he observes, “do not want 
to be mom, and they do not feel comfortable being mom.”62 Fur-
thermore, he notes that “[n]owhere in the world has there ever been 
a society known to exist in which men were the primary caretakers of 
young children. The reason has much to do with the biological na-
ture of males and females.”63 
It would seem counterintuitive to believe that biological organ-
isms, which have developed to reproduce themselves through the 
sexual union of male and female, do not also require the input of 
both male and female in order to rear, with optimal success, the chil-
dren produced by their sexual union. Certainly, circumstances will 
sometimes prevent what is optimal from happening. But it is ex-
tremely foolish for society to treat the accommodations we must 
make in order to survive bad circumstances as if they are on an equal 
footing with the best outcomes. Society should not teach its citizens 
that being reared by two women or two men, who are admittedly 
unwilling or unable to unite with the opposite sex, is just as good as 
being reared by a father and a mother, who have proved themselves 
capable both of uniting and then living with that other sex—which 
is, of course, about one-half of the world’s population. 
Children learn the most important lessons about how to relate to 
the opposite sex from observing how their parents interact with their 
own children and with each other in their daily lives. These crucial 
lessons will be denied to any children raised by same-sex couples, 
who will never teach by their own example how to live with the op-
posite sex. It is very difficult to absorb these lessons from books or 
television or from conversations with one’s peers; anyone who has 
been raised by a single parent knows that this is true. And what the 
children of divorce have always known, is now being established by 
research that shows that the adverse impact of divorce on children is 
 
 61. Id. at 7. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id.; see also DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW 
EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF 
CHILDREN AND SOCIETY (1999). 
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often deep, long lasting, and, in fact, increases over time.64 
As Amato and Booth point out, “fathers are mainly important to 
the extent that they are part of a larger mother-father-child triad.”65 
Rather than questioning the relative importance of mothers and fa-
thers in influencing children’s development, it is more meaningful, 
they say, to think about the “quality of the mother-father-triad as be-
ing a key predictor of children’s outcomes,” which suggests that “fa-
thers may play their most important role in children’s lives as a 
member of the marital partnership.”66 This concept that the family 
does its best for the child through the interaction of man, woman, 
and child is summed up in David Blankenhorn’s statement that “the 
preconditions for effective fatherhood are twofold: coresidency with 
children and a parental alliance with the mother.”67 
After an extensive analysis of the advocacy efforts to establish that 
homosexual parenting is as good for children as heterosexual parent-
ing, Lynn Wardle has concluded that the evidence does not support 
this claim. Most studies of homosexual parenting are “based on very 
unreliable quantitative research, flawed methodologically and ana-
lytically,” but even from this body of research “there are indications 
of some significant potential detriments to children from homosexual 
parenting.”68 As Wardle notes, because “there are gender-linked dif-
ferences in child-rearing skills,” heterosexual parenting has the great 
advantage of providing children with the different “strengths and at-
tributes” of both men and women.69 “Homosexual parenting,” 
Wardle concludes, “poses particular risks for the emotional and gen-
der development of children,” who will “do better in school, have 
 
 64. JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN ET AL., THE UNEXPECTED LEGACY OF DIVORCE: A 25 
YEAR LANDMARK STUDY (2000). The overwhelmingly positive effects on both children and 
parents of living in a married household are set forth by Linda J. Waite and Maggie Gallagher 
in THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER AND 
BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000). 
 65. AMATO & BOOTH, supra note 52, at 230. 
 66. Id. 
 67. DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST 
URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 18 (1995). 
 68. Lynn D. Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 
U. ILL. L. REV. 833, 844 (1997); see also ROBERT LERNER & ALTHEA NAGAI, MARRIAGE 
LAW PROJECT, NO BASIS: WHAT THE STUDIES DON’T TELL US ABOUT SAME-SEX PARENTING 
(2001) (analyzing forty-nine studies and concluding they are all gravely deficient). 
 69. Wardle, supra note 68, at 857; see also George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Tradi-
tional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 634 (1999) (arguing that children with both a mother 
and a father will learn better how to live in a world consisting of males and females). 
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fewer emotional crises, and become functioning adults best when 
they are reared in two-parent, dual-gender families.”70 
David Blankenhorn has documented the devastating effects of fa-
ther absence on children, especially on boys. Anyone who is tempted 
to think that a young boy being raised by a single woman or by ho-
mosexuals of either sex is not being deprived of something that boys 
need for optimal growth and social adjustment—no matter how 
kind, loving, and well-intentioned these people may all be—should 
pay heed to Blankenhorn’s description of what boys require to ma-
ture into fully functioning, socially well-adjusted adult men. 
The father, says Blankenhorn, is “irreplaceable” in helping boys 
“to separate from their mothers in search of the meaning of their 
maleness.”71 The father “enables the son to separate from the 
mother” by “showing him on good authority that he can be ‘man 
enough.’”72 Thus, the boy becomes the son of his father and later 
“he will reunite with the world of women, the world of his mother, 
through his spouse and children.”73 But when this process does not 
succeed, the result is rage: “[r]age against the mother, against 
women, against society. It is a deeply misogynistic rage, vividly ex-
pressed, for example, in contemporary rap music with titles such as 
‘Beat That Bitch with a Bat.’”74 
Insofar as the ALI Principles validate homosexual parenting, they 
strike the same blow for favoring the individual autonomy of adults 
over the interests of children that they strike when validating unmar-
ried cohabitation. The ALI apparently accepts the fact that the tradi-
tional family is in decline and seems unwilling to make any attempt 
to resurrect it. A variety of family forms are equal, the ALI con-
cludes, or at least are good enough. That our society needs laws that 
would try to teach its citizens about their duty to exert themselves 
mightily so that their children can grow up in a marital home with 
their natural father and mother is, unfortunately, not a proposition 
which seems congenial to the ALI. 
 
 70. Wardle, supra note 68, at 863. 
 71. BLANKENHORN, supra note 67, at 30. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
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VII. A SEXUALLY DEPOLARIZED SOCIETY 
How do we manage to trash our own society so badly? Some in-
sight into this question appears in Charles Winick’s The New People: 
Desexualization in American Life,75 which describes the process of 
male feminization and female masculinization that, by the end of the 
1960s, had produced an increasingly androgynous society. Writing in 
1968, Winick documented the unprecedented neutering of our soci-
ety by examining music and dancing, fiction, painting, theater, men’s 
and women’s clothing, men’s phenomenally increased use of beauty 
products, our manner of speaking, names given to children, recrea-
tional activities, and the manner of consummating sexual relations. 
The process of turning this culture around may begin when 
enough people acknowledge, and then act upon, the truth of 
Winick’s many insights. “Archeologists of the future,” he observes, 
“may regard a radical dislocation of sexual identity as the single most 
important event of our time” because “radical changes in sex roles 
may lead to extermination of whole species.”76 And when we be-
moan the intractable drug problem in this country, we might heed 
Winick’s warning that the “depersonalization and flattening of sex 
roles can be so threatening that young people withdraw from active 
participation to the world of inner experience provided by drugs. 
Many who have lost moorings to masculinity and femininity anchor 
upon the self and employ drugs as an ultimate prosthetic.”77 
Perceiving few signs of any change in the direction in which our 
culture was moving, Winick concluded that if we continued our drift 
toward “depolarization of sex,” men and women might “ultimately 
be able to produce nothing together and each will become a less ap-
propriate audience for the distinctive performance of the other.”78 
Anyone who sees a smattering of truth in these observations should 
consider carefully before supporting any measures that might further 
subvert a traditional organization of family relations. 
 
 75. CHARLES WINICK, THE NEW PEOPLE: DESEXUALIZATION IN AMERICAN LIFE x 
(1968). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 335. 
 78. Id. at 358. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
If Charles Winick is correct that the most important event of our 
time has been the radical dislocation of sexual identity, and if he is 
also correct that radical changes in sex roles may lead to extermina-
tion of whole species, then surely our culture is in danger. The femi-
nist movement’s quest for androgyny—the quintessential radical dis-
location of sexual identity—has witnessed stellar success. With the 
twin weapons of no-fault divorce and the status degradation of 
homemakers, feminists successfully convinced large numbers of 
women to abandon their homemaking and child-rearing roles, and 
the two-career family has become the cultural paradigm. 
In these feminist efforts, the ALI has been a willing ally. The sex-
ual depolarization of our society is already evidenced by the great 
decline in the number of heterosexual couples who assume tradi-
tional sex roles within the family. Further depolarization of the sexes 
will continue with validation of same-sex domestic partnerships and 
of homosexual parenting and may well reach completion with the le-
galization of same-sex marriage. With these Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution, the ALI takes its place at the forefront of the 
feminist march to complete androgyny. 
 
